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Abstract 
 
Electricity market reforms have pursued two main goals, both aimed at increasing economic 
efficiency. The first is to make prices more reflective of costs so that consumers can make 
more efficient decisions about where and when to consume electricity. The second goal is to 
ensure that suppliers minimize the costs of supply. How successful has electricity market 
reform in Texas been with regard to achieving these goals? We focus on one aspect of this 
overall set of desired outcomes, namely whether movements in retail prices reflect wholesale 
market prices and whether reform has delivered cost reductions in the delivery of energy 
services by retailers. We find clear evidence that retail prices in competitive market areas 
better reflect wholesale prices and have moved favorably for consumers relative to wholesale 
prices. The same is not necessarily true for consumers in non-competitive market areas. This 
suggests that competitive retail markets have delivered cost reductions consistent with 
electricity service providers reducing their marginal costs. The effort that Texas undertook 
over a decade ago to introduce competition into the retail electricity supply thus appears to 
be yielding the benefits to consumers that were intended in competitive areas. Consumers in 
less competitive areas do not appear to have benefited as much. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Electricity markets in the United States have generally exhibited one of two types of 
market structures—often characterized as “regulated” versus “deregulated”—or a 
combination thereof.1 The first extreme, a regulated vertically integrated utility, is the 
older, more traditional form of load-serving entity. In the past two decades, however, 
market reform has, to varying extents, unbundled the vertically integrated paradigm and 
facilitated entry by new firms, resulting in competition at the wholesale or retail level, or 
both. The more competitive structures can also retain varying degrees of price and service 
regulation, and different mechanisms for determining market prices. The introduction of 
reforms has varied regionally and over time, but the general tendency in the US since the 
1990s has been a slow movement toward deregulated, competitive markets. In fact, 
according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), by 2015 over 20% of total US 
electricity sales came from retail power marketers or retail energy providers. 
 
The Texas electricity market featured vertically integrated utilities until the passage of 
Senate Bill 7 in 1999, which allowed competition in the market.2 Utilities were restructured 
or “unbundled” into retail energy providers, generators, and distribution and transmission 
																																																								
1 The characterization of electricity markets as “deregulated” is an oversimplification. Electricity market 
reform generally increases the number of competing firms at the wholesale and retail levels by splitting 
formerly vertically integrated firms, and alters the rules of the market in order to facilitate entry and 
competition at the wholesale and retail levels. Thus, the change might be better characterized as a 
change in the market structure and regulatory apparatus away from the traditional vertically integrated 
regulated monopoly model of the past rather than an elimination of regulation altogether. 
2 Zarnikau (2005), Adib and Zarnikau (2006), and Zarnikau and Whitworth (2006) provide detailed 
overviews of the Texas electricity reform. 
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utility companies before consumer choice commenced 15 years ago, in January 2002.3 In 
the five years that followed, transitory provisions such as mandated price caps or “price-to-
beat” were established to incentivize market entry.  
 
Today, “the ERCOT market is generally considered to be the most successful of the 
restructured electricity markets in North America” (Zarnikau 2011), with more retail 
competition than any other market in Canada and the US (DEFG 2015). Moreover, the 
Texas market is remarkable among deregulated markets for its customer participation. 
According to the 2017 Public Utility Commission of Texas draft report “Scope of 
Competition in Electric Markets in Texas,”  as of March 2016, 92% of all customers have 
exercised their right to choose an electricity provider (PUC 2017). The success is also 
evidenced by the fact that about 75% of all electricity sold in Texas is to retail choice 
consumers (ERCOT 2016). 
 
The Texas experience is not universally accepted as a success. Notably, a recent study 
commissioned by the Texas Coalition for Affordable Power (TCAP 2016) claims that 
electricity deregulation in Texas has not delivered the intended outcome. In particular, the 
study notes among its major findings that Texans paid average residential rates that were 
6.4% below the national average in the 10 years prior to deregulation but 8.5% higher in the 
10 years following deregulation. The study also asserts that the “price-to-beat” mechanism 
failed, highlights the role of natural gas prices as a determining feature of electricity prices, 
and points to higher transmission and distribution costs as factors that have contributed to 
higher rates in Texas.  
 
In this study, we find that residential rates in competitive and non-competitive areas of 
Texas have behaved in a manner that is consistent with economic theory. More 
specifically, residential rates in competitive areas are highly reflective of wholesale rates, 
which suggests that electricity providers are minimizing costs in meeting market demands. 
By contrast, residential rates in non-competitive areas do not generally reflect wholesale 
rates. Furthermore, we find a shrinking gap between residential rates and wholesale rates in 
competitive areas, which is consistent with improvements in firm and market efficiency. 
This also has not generally been the case in non-competitive areas. 
 
Importantly, we also find that residential rates in areas with regional cooperatives tend to 
behave more similarly to those in competitive market areas. A possible explanation is that 
such cooperatives still must effectively compete with outside entities for market access. We 
elaborate more on this below, but the implication is that the introduction of market 
competition has spillover effects on some less competitive market areas.  
 
We have also examined site-specific load and billing data for several large commercial 
consumers of electricity. This provides a more complete picture of the behavior of 
electricity rates in the state of Texas across competitive and non-competitive areas since 
market reforms began. The data reveal that commercial electricity consumers in non-																																																								
3  Intelometry (2008) provides a detailed description of the utility unbundling and name history. 
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competitive areas generally pay higher rates than those in competitive areas. Commercial 
customers in non-competitive areas may thus be cross-subsidizing residential customers. 
Since commercial customers tend to have a lower price elasticity of demand, this may 
indicate that local load-serving entities in non-competitive areas are engaging in more 
price discrimination. However, if the cross-subsidies become large relative to the costs of 
onsite generation, such as the falling cost of (subsidized) solar power, commercial 
customers may install their own generating capabilities. In that case, residential rates may 
be forced to adjust upward so that the utility can cover its costs. 
 
In Section II we provide background information on the Texas electricity market and 
reforms and discuss some relevant literature. Section III discusses the data and 
methodologies used in the analysis, while Section IV presents the results and explores their 
implications. Section V examines commercial sector electricity rates, before we summarize 
our conclusions in Section VI. 
 
II.  Background and Literature 
 
Texas consumers have historically enjoyed low retail electricity rates relative to national 
prices. An exception is the period from 2002 to 2010, when natural gas prices increased 
significantly before declining with the shale revolution. Notwithstanding volatility in 
energy markets, average electricity rates in Texas since 2000 across all sectors have been, 
on average, $0.003/kWh lower than national rates (Energy Information Administration 
2016), with variation across time and across major consuming sectors (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Real US and Texas Electricity Rates by Sector, 2000-2016 
 
 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration 
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Figure 2. Real Electricity Rates and Natural Gas Prices in Texas, 2000-2016 
 
 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration 
 
 
Over the same period, 2000-2016, the residential sector in Texas has averaged 
$0.003/kWh above national rates, while the commercial sector has averaged $0.010/kWh 
below the national average. The industrial sector average has kept virtual parity with the 
national rate. 
 
Figure 2 shows that, for every sector, the temporal variation in Texas electricity prices is 
tied to movements in the price of natural gas. This reflects the fact that natural gas plants 
most often provide marginal generation in Texas. Across the nation, while there is 
considerable variation in regulatory regimes, there is also variation in the marginal fuel. 
This latter point is salient when comparing the movement of rates across time and across 
sectors. Indeed, when one considers the trends before and after 2008, when domestic 
natural gas prices peaked, simple averages comparing Texas relative to the rest of the US 
can be misleading. In fact, from 2009-2016 residential sector rates in Texas have averaged 
$0.006/kWh below national rates, commercial sector rates have averaged $0.019/kWh 
below national rates, and industrial sector rates have averaged $0.009/kWh below national 
rates. Moreover, in 2016, the discount for Texas consumers dipped to $0.015/kWh, 
$0.026/kWh, and $0.015/kWh in the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors, 
respectively. Thus, the discount for consumers in Texas has expanded over the last decade.  
 
Figure 3 also shows that the differences between the US and Texas in residential and 
industrial electricity rates are quite different from the difference in commercial rates. 
Since only 20% of US electricity sales came from retail power marketers or retail energy 
providers as of 2015, the rate discrepancies are likely correlated to market structure. We 
return to this issue below.  
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Figure 3. Electricity Rate Differences–Texas Minus US, 2000-2016 
 
 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration 
 
 
Figure 4. Real Average Monthly Electricity Rates by Sector in Texas,  Jan. 2002–Dec. 2016 
 
 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration 
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Figure 4 graphs the inflation-adjusted (real) average retail rates across sectors in Texas by 
month. It shows that monthly rates to industrial and commercial consumers fell from the 
beginning of the sample to the end, while the residential rate is virtually flat. Rates 
generally increased from 2002 through 2006 before peaking in 2008, then declined 
thereafter. It is important to note electricity rates in real terms because the purchasing 
power of a dollar changed over the sample period for consumers and firms alike. Nominal 
price data examined over limited windows of time can give quite a different impression to 
the trends displayed in Figure 4. Such analyses have led to the observation that retail rates 
have increased faster in consumer choice areas compared to non-competitive market 
areas, with concomitant erroneous conclusions about the impact of competition in the 
marketplace. 
 
There is extensive research examining the impact of deregulation and market restructuring 
on electricity rates. “Most studies conclude that there have been some efficiency gains 
[from restructuring of the electricity industry], but the subject of whether retail prices have 
fallen has been contentious” (Blumsack, Lave, and Apt 2008). Texas has been cited as an 
example with mixed post-restructuring results. As noted above, retail prices generally 
trended up more rapidly in competitive market areas than in non-competitive market 
areas from 2002 through 2006. Subsequently, retail rates tended to converge toward 
wholesale rates, indicating that competition was providing benefits by stimulating 
efficiency gains. To tease out the effects of restructuring per se, one needs to allow for 
other factors impacting prices in the Texas market at the same time. 
 
Lower prices are the key benefit expected from market restructuring, but other intrinsic 
and extrinsic benefits are important when analyzing a policy. Previous studies have 
quantified some of the Texas-specific effects of market restructuring.4 For instance, 
deregulation of the market resulted in increased diversity in generation mix (see, for 
example, Zarnikau 2011), achieved energy efficiency goals (see Zarnikau, Isser, and Martin 
2015), and augmented a variety of value-added products and services (see Rai and Zarnikau 
2016). Other benefits include increased consumer choice, innovative new products and 
services, customizable rates,5 environmental benefits from increased renewable growth, 
and general market efficiency gains from competition.  
 
A recent study conducted by the Texas Coalition for Affordable Power (TCAP 2016) shows 
that customers in areas exempt from deregulation have on average enjoyed lower 
residential rates compared to those in deregulated areas. The study also quantifies the 
hypothetical savings customers in deregulated areas would have enjoyed had they paid the 
average rates of regulated areas during the same period. Although the simplistic but 
objective finding that retail rates have on average been lower in regulated areas is an 
accurate observation, it ignores the path of prices over time and, thus, fails to identify the 																																																								
4 For an extensive list of consumer choice attributes see Goett, Hudson, and Train (2000) and for 
benefits and costs resulting from retail competition see Bae, et al. (2014) and Christensen Associates 
Energy Consulting LLC (2016).  
5 A complete list of retail energy providers, plans, and rates are available at the PUC website at 
www.powertochoose.com. 
Electricity Reform and Retail Pricing in Texas 
8 
dynamic effects of the market reform in Texas. In particular, the study makes no attempt 
to assess whether rates were lower in the areas that remained regulated before the reforms 
were introduced, and how those rates have changed through time. 
 
The tendency to measure the success of market restructuring in terms of retail rates may 
result from the tendency of policymakers and politicians to focus on the hoped-for 
outcomes from introducing competition as being most salient to voters. To examine this 
policy objective, Woo and Zarnikau (2009) develop a theoretical economic model to show 
that rate reduction following deregulation depends on post-reform marginal costs being 
below average costs. Besides pointing out post-reform failures in Ontario, California and 
other North American markets, the authors also note that the prerequisite assumption 
about the relationship between marginal and average costs has failed in Texas, specifically 
citing increasing natural gas prices.  
 
Borenstein and Bushnell (2015) showed that natural gas prices have had a stronger effect on 
electricity rates in the US than restructuring efforts. Moreover, rates in restructured 
markets are dictated by marginal generation costs rather than average costs, and natural gas 
generators often are the marginal suppliers. By contrast, “cost-of-service” regulation tends 
to result in prices that reflect average costs, reducing the impact of natural gas prices and 
wholesale prices on retail rates. Thus, as markets continue to become more competitive, 
the price of electricity may be expected to move more with the natural gas price. On the 
other hand, other factors such as policies that internalize environmental costs and promote 
renewable integration may also take greater precedence over time.6 While these factors will 
play out predominantly in wholesale markets, their impacts are relevant for retail price 
formation. Furthermore, how they manifest in retail prices will depend on market 
structure, in particular because wholesale prices in a competitive market reflect the 
marginal generation source, whatever it may be. Given the fact that natural gas is the fuel at 
the margin in the competitive wholesale market in Texas (ERCOT 2016), we implicitly 
account for natural gas price movements by including wholesale prices in the analysis.  
 
In this study, we use 15+ years of monthly data to explore the evolving effects of market 
reform in Texas since January 2002. Over that time, ERCOT has progressed from a market 
transitioning to competition to one that is now relatively mature. Retail consumers have 
had ample opportunity to fully internalize the potential benefits of choice in provider. In 
addition, competition has expanded market depth and promoted firm-level efforts to 
lower costs through innovation and technology adoption.  
 
Importantly, studies estimating post-reform electricity prices must account for price 
movements that resulted from multiple or phased regulatory interventions. In Texas, for 
example, it is possible that the periods from 2002 to 2005 and 2005 to 2007 could be 
impacted by market features such as a customer choice default to regulated rates and the 
“price-to-beat” program, respectively. Kang and Zarnikau (2009) prudently acknowledge 																																																								
6 For more information on the impact of the growth of renewables on electricity prices, please refer 
to Pfund and Chhabra (2015) and Tra (2016). 
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these effects. Specifically, by analyzing prices in Texas following the removal of the “price-
to-beat” retail price caps they show that prices declined even though natural gas prices 
remained high during their study period. 
 
This study uses Texas electricity price data across competitive and non-competitive market 
areas to focus on competitive retail electricity markets. Papers using a related approach 
include Joskow (2000) and Hortaçsu, et al. (2015). Similar to Borenstein and Bushnell 
(2015), we also examine post-reform price trends. 
 
A note on price-taking (competitive) retail electricity providers 
Consider a firm that sells electricity, , to consumers in sector  at a price, , and is a 
price-taker. It can generate its own power,7 , or purchase power in the wholesale market, 
, to meet its customer service obligations. It will pay a price in the wholesale market 
given as  and a transfer price to its own generators given as . The firm also pays for 
transmission and distribution, given as , where total cost is dependent on the total 
amount of power it sells, .  In addition, the firm must cover all other costs of operations, 
denoted . This includes items such as labor and is also positively related to total 
electricity sales. Finally, the firm will seek to maximize profits from all electricity sales.  
 
Hence, we can formulate this firm’s problem as 
 
subject to 
 
 
 
Noting that , we can find our first order necessary conditions for an interior  
 
maximum as 
    
  
																																																								
7 While many of the firms supplying retail electricity in Texas do not generate their own power—
indeed separating these functions is a key part of the reform process—some vertically integrated 
firms remain.  
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and 
. 
Notice, this implies  
     and     . 
 
In other words, the firm will set the retail price equal to the price of power purchased in 
the wholesale market plus the marginal cost of operations. Moreover, it will balance 
delivery between its own generation sources and the wholesale market such that the price 
at the margin will be the same across generation sources. If the firm does not own any 
generation resources, then the problem simplifies to one in which . Similarly, if the 
firm does not purchase power from the wholesale market, we have .8 
 
The above example illustrates that for the price-taking firm in a competitive retail market, 
the retail price to consumers in sector , , is a markup over the wholesale price, .  
 
The markup in the example above is given as , which is a function of all 
distribution and operating costs the firm faces. Importantly, the firm may be able to 
lower its costs through reducing labor costs or transmission and distribution costs, 
although such investments are not explicit in this example. Such changes would lower  
the markup over time.  
 
If the firm is not a price-taker or attempts to redistribute costs across consuming sectors, it 
may deviate from the example above. An example of this may be if the firm redistributes 
costs from sector  to sector  in order to satisfy a competing objective—perhaps by 
placing greater value on the surplus of residential consumers (and voters) than on the surplus 
of other customers.9 The result would be a reduction in the markup for consumers in sector 
 with a compensating increase in the markup for consumers in sector . Empirically, this 
would create a confounding effect for identifying the markup through time and could even 
mask the relevance of the wholesale price of power for retail rates in sector .  
 
																																																								
8 For the firms in our analysis from the state of Texas, the latter case is never true. Since our focus is 
the retail market, we ignore the choice of generation in this paper and assume that firms take 
wholesale prices as given. 
9 An example of this is seen in Hartley and Medlock (2008). They noted that competing objectives for 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) interfered with a revenue-efficient outcome. Although SOEs were 
still assumed to be maximizing an objective, that objective included factors other than profit as a 
result of political influence.  
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In addition, in non-competitive areas where the incumbent utility holds a monopoly 
position, rate-making may be based on an entirely different model, such as cost-of-service. 
In such cases, an annual revenue target can be modeled as the sum of  
• a regulated return on undepreciated capital, plus  
• depreciation expenses, plus  
• operating expenses such as labor, maintenance, and fuel, plus  
• tax liabilities.  
 
Price is then determined by effectively allocating revenue requirements across customers. 
In these cases, the vertically integrated structure of the utility can render the above model 
of a price-taking firm invalid because retail pricing is also dependent on the activities of 
the utility in the generation of electricity. By guaranteeing a rate of return on expended 
capital, the utility can be incentivized to expand its generation portfolio and roll its 
purchases from the wholesale market into its rate base. This would distort the influence of 
the wholesale price on the retail price, reduce the firm’s incentive to improve efficiency, 
and encourage it to expand its rate base. If true, we would not see evidence of cost 
reductions over time, a point to which we return below.   
 
III. Data and Methodology 
 
The data used in the empirical analysis are taken from ERCOT, the Texas Public Utilities 
Commission, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, the US Energy Information 
Administration, and the US Federal Reserve. We also have collected data under 
confidentiality from commercial consumers of power with facilities across the state of 
Texas in both non-competitive and competitive zones. All pricing and cost data are in real 
2015$, using the US Consumer Price Index as a deflator. 
 
The monthly Electric Utility Bill Comparison published by the Rate Regulation Division of 
the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC 2017) gives aggregated residential electricity 
bill data for competitive and non-competitive areas for the years 2002 through 2016. The 
billing data for each residential customer grouping (at 500kWh and 1000kWh, 
respectively) was normalized by the load classification. This provides an effective average 
rate for electricity to each customer group, which is plotted in Figures 5 and 6 for the 
1000kWh customer group.10 These data are used throughout the analysis. Importantly, the 
rates, constructed in this manner, should be viewed as representative because the actual 
load in the different customer categories may not be exactly 500kWh or 1000kWh. 
Moreover, the billing data include non-commodity costs, such as fees for various services. 
Unfortunately, individual customer data is not available. 
 
The data considered in this study are from eight non-competitive market areas— 
Southwestern Public Service (SWPS), Southwestern Electric Power (SWEP), Magic Valley 
EC, Upshur EC, Victoria EC, Austin Energy, CPS Energy, the City of San Marcos—and five 																																																								
10 Note that renormalizing the bills by a constant does not alter the conclusions of the statistical analysis.  
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competitive market areas—AEP Texas Central, AEP Texas South, Oncor, Reliant/ 
CenterPoint, and Texas-New Mexico Power. In the non-competitive market areas, SWPS 
and SWEP are investor-owned utilities; Magic Valley EC, Upshur EC, and Victoria EC are 
electricity cooperatives; and Austin Energy, CPS Energy, and the City of San Marcos are 
municipally-owned utilities.11 To construct a complete time series in the competitive areas, 
the reported data series were merged to allow for ownership changes over time. 
Specifically, the data for TXU was linked with data for Oncor as of May 2007; data for 
Reliant was linked to data for CenterPoint; Central Power and Light was linked with AEP 
Texas Central; and West Texas Utilities was linked with AEP Texas North as of July 2006. 
The resulting time series are presented graphically in Figures 5 (monthly) and 6 (annual 
averages), together with four zonal wholesale price series.  
   
Figure 5: Monthly Residential Electricity Rates (1000kWh load, 2015$) and Wholesale 
Electricity Prices (2015$), Jan. 2002-Dec. 2016 
 
 
 
Data Sources: Nominal data collected from the Texas PUC and ERCOT and converted to real 2015$ 
using the US Consumer Price Index from the US Federal Reserve Database. 
 
 
The ERCOT wholesale electricity price from the beginning of January 2002 through the 
end of November 2010 is reported as zonal 15-minute prices and obtained from the 
Balancing Market Prices for Energy and Resource archived datasets of the Electric 
Reliability Council of Texas. ERCOT wholesale prices from the beginning of December 
2010 until the end of December 2016 are reported as nodal hourly day-ahead market 
prices and are obtained from the Day-Ahead Market Information portal of the Electric 																																																								
11 While there are more non-competitive market areas than those included in this analysis, the time 
series data are incomplete. Notably, Pedernales EC, one of the largest electricity cooperatives in the 
nation, is not included in this analysis for this reason. We also opted to use data for those areas that 
lie within ERCOT so that the wholesale prices remain relevant for the retail pricing in each region. 
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Reliability Council of Texas. The two wholesale price series are merged to create the time 
series of zonal wholesale prices used in the analysis.  
 
Figure 6. Annual Residential Electricity Rates (1000kWh load, 2015$) and Wholesale 
Electricity Prices (2015$), 2002-2016* 
 
 
 
Data Sources: Nominal data collected from the Texas PUC and ERCOT and converted to real 2015$ 
using the US Consumer Price Index from the US Federal Reserve Database. 
*Note the data are annual averages so do not depict the seasonality in rates in some non-competitive 
areas that is apparent in Figure 5. 
 
 
The annual data in Figure 6 are presented for illustrative purposes only, but they do 
reveal some insights obtained from the statistical analysis of the monthly data below. To 
begin, the annual data indicate residential prices closely track wholesale prices in the 
competitive market areas, but generally do not in non-competitive areas. The data also 
indicate that residential rates were lower in competitive areas in 2016 than in 2002, but 
higher in non-competitive areas. In other words, (real) prices have generally declined 
since 2002 in competitive areas but increased in non-competitive areas. Of course, the 
rates to residential customers rose significantly in competitive areas relative to non-
competitive areas through 2006 before beginning to track downward after 2008. This 
tends to match closely the patterns observed in wholesale prices, which, as discussed 
above, tended to track natural gas prices. 
 
The second observation from Figure 6 is that while the gap between retail and wholesale 
rates has declined over the time horizon in competitive areas, it has generally widened in 
non-competitive areas. This indicates competition is driving the costs of providing 
electricity service down in competitive areas.     
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To further highlight these points, Table 1 presents some summary statistics for the data 
considered in this study. A few things from Table 1 and Figures 5 and 6 are worth 
highlighting and reiterating: 
• The average rate paid for electricity by residential consumers in competitive areas 
has been higher than that paid by residential consumers in non-competitive areas. 
• In 2002, the average price paid by residential customers in competitive areas was 
between two and three cents higher than the rates paid in non-competitive areas. 
This is before market reforms and retail competition could have had a material 
impact on the price paid by residential customers. 
• In 2016, the average price paid by residential customers in competitive areas was 
roughly equal, in aggregate, to the average price paid in non-competitive areas, with 
some competitive areas actually seeing rates below those in non-competitive areas. 
In fact, in all competitive areas prices declined from 2002 to 2016, but they 
increased in non-competitive areas over the same time period.  
• Wholesale prices declined from 2002 to 2016, which is generally consistent with 
trends observed in natural gas markets in Texas and across the country (not 
pictured). 
• The declines in residential prices in competitive areas from 2002 to 2016 were 
generally larger than the declines in wholesale prices, which is consistent with 
efficiency gains and associated cost reductions in the competitive market.    
• The volatility of residential prices (measured by standard deviation) in competitive 
areas has been higher than in non-competitive areas. Moreover, price volatility in 
competitive areas has generally mirrored wholesale price volatility in competitive 
areas, but the same is not true in non-competitive areas. 
• The changes in wholesale and residential prices from 2002 to 2016, and the patterns 
of volatility in the price series, support the notion that residential prices better 
reflect wholesale prices in competitive areas. This result is consistent with electricity 
service providers acting in a competitive market and suggests that competitive 
markets have delivered what was intended. 
 
While much insight can be gleaned from the summary statistics in Table 1, it is important 
to evaluate the data more rigorously. Therefore, to investigate the effects of market reform 
on price formation at the retail residential level, we estimate a model that stipulates the 
retail rate for residential customers is a function of the wholesale market rate and labor 
cost in the electric utility industry. We also account for a variety of other effects, 
summarized as:  
• Regular seasonal influences on residential price relative to wholesale price are 
captured through monthly dummy variables;  
• In several utility regions dominated by electricity cooperatives, infrequent periods 
of extremely low rates—occurring at most six times in a single utility region during 
the 15-year period under consideration—were observed, perhaps due to rate 
promotions or other marketing mechanisms;  
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• Finally, the “price-to-beat” mechanism is identified with a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one prior to January 2007 and zero thereafter. Similarly, a time 
variable is also introduced for the period prior to January 2007 and the period after 
to account for any tendency of the retail rate to drift relative to the wholesale rate 
during the different periods. (Note that this also accounts for the aforementioned 
criticism levied in Kang and Zarnikau [2009] regarding studies that focus on the 
period prior to 2007.)  
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Data Presented in Figure 5 
 
 
 
Data Sources: Nominal data collected from the Texas PUC and ERCOT and converted to real 2015$ 
using the US Consumer Price Index from the US Federal Reserve Database. Calculations by authors. 
 
 
We also considered accounting for the development, through 2013, of the competitive 
renewable energy zones’ (CREZ) transmission capacity to connect wind energy resources in 
West Texas to load centers in Central and East Texas. 12  However, any cost impacts from 
the CREZ transmission infrastructure should be captured in wholesale prices. In fact, the 
impacts not only of transmission upgrades but also new generation capacity anywhere in 
ERCOT should be reflected in the wholesale electricity rates.  
 
  
																																																								
12 In 2005, the Texas Legislature mandated the Texas PUC to work with ERCOT in identifying areas 
with the greatest wind generation potential. Those regions—totaling five across West Texas and the 
Panhandle—were designated as the CREZ. Subsequently, transmission plans were developed to 
deliver the electricity generated in those areas to load centers in Central and East Texas. The plan 
included about 2,400 miles of new transmission lines at a cost of about $7 billion, and was completed 
in 2013. 
Sample Average 
(Jan02-Dec16)
Std Deviation 
(Jan02-Dec16) 2002 Average 2016 Average
Rate Change 
(2002-2016)
SWPS 0.0967 0.0099 0.0835 0.1007 0.0171
SWEP 0.0856 0.0127 0.0823 0.0942 0.0119
Magic Valley 0.1069 0.0155 0.0910 0.0933 0.0023
Upshur 0.0948 0.0090 0.0814 0.1021 0.0208
Victoria 0.1110 0.0117 0.0957 0.1077 0.0120
Austin Energy 0.1032 0.0074 0.0993 0.1005 0.0013
CPS 0.0975 0.0095 0.0910 0.1055 0.0145
San Marcos 0.0986 0.0093 0.0867 0.0912 0.0045
AEP-CTX 0.1341 0.0250 0.1155 0.1047 -0.0108
AEP-NTX 0.1297 0.0288 0.1143 0.1019 -0.0124
Oncor 0.1228 0.0243 0.1090 0.0930 -0.0161
Reliant/CPT 0.1311 0.0247 0.1125 0.1021 -0.0104
TX-NM 0.1275 0.0220 0.1182 0.1000 -0.0182
Wholesale-West 0.0449 0.0214 0.0315 0.0216 -0.0099
Wholesale-South 0.0459 0.0232 0.0294 0.0239 -0.0055
Wholesale-North 0.0452 0.0217 0.0329 0.0219 -0.0110
Wholesale-Houston 0.0464 0.0234 0.0323 0.0237 -0.0086
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As noted above, in the competitive case where the firm is a price-taker, the retail price 
should be a function of the wholesale price, the cost of transmission and distribution, and 
any other firm-specific operating costs. As such, we estimate for each region i the following 
equation: 
. 
 
The included variables (prices and wages in real terms) are defined as follows: 
•  denotes the residential electricity rate in region i at time t,  
•  denotes the wholesale electricity rate in region i at time t,  
•  denotes the labor rate in region i at time t,  
•  denotes the time trend from January 2002 through December 2006,  
•  denotes the time trend from January 2007 through December 2016,  
•  is the “price- to-beat” dummy variable that takes a value of one for all dates 
prior to January 2007 and zero thereafter,  
•  is a vector of monthly dummy variables capturing seasonal variation, and  
•  is a dummy variable specific to region i (some regions only) that takes a value 
of one if very low outlier rates are observed in region i, perhaps due to promotions 
or rebates, and is zero otherwise.  
 
Lastly,  are the coefficients to be estimated and  is an error term. We estimate the 
above equation for each region simultaneously using the seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) estimator, which accounts for correlation in the error terms across equations.13 
 
We expect, a priori, that a firm acting as a price-taker will be adequately described by the 
above estimated equation. However, a firm in a non-competitive region will likely price its 
electricity sales differently as it may maximize an alternative objective function including 
as arguments, for example, rents on its own generation resources or political support for its 
politician monitors. In that case, the above estimated equation may not adequately 
describe the pricing behavior of firms in non-competitive areas.  
 
  
																																																								
13 Ordinary least squares (OLS) on each individual equation yields consistent parameter estimates, 
but SUR is more efficient. We expect the error terms to be contemporaneously correlated since some 
explanatory variables omitted from the equation may affect many regions at the same time. SUR and 
OLS are equivalent when the OLS error terms are uncorrelated across equations or when each 
equation contains the exact same regressors. 
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IV. Results 
 
Table 2 gives parameter estimates for the above model.14 Note that Table 2 presents the 
results for the residential sector for consumers with a greater than 1000kWh load. The 
results for the 500kWh consumers are included in an appendix, but, aside from the 
constant term in the regression, are not very different from the results in Table 2. The 
difference in the estimated constant term for the two categories of customers suggests that 
residential consumers across the entire state face block declining rates, but the lack of 
difference among the other parameters suggests relative price movements are consistent 
across residential customer classes within each utility area.  
 
The parameter estimates indicate strong similarities across competitive areas. In fact, 
estimates of the effects of wholesale prices, labor costs, the price-to-beat mechanism, 
observed efficiency gains, and path dependence for residential prices are all very uniform. 
Moreover, there appears to be little regular seasonal influence on pricing that is not already 
accounted for in the wholesale market. 
 
By contrast, the results indicate that non-competitive areas vary significantly from each 
other and from competitive areas. In general, pricing in non-competitive areas does not 
tend to conform to the model of a price-taking firm presented in the previous section. 
Indeed, in some non-competitive areas, confounding effects mask any statistically 
significant relationship between retail price and wholesale price.  
 
Regarding the influence of each variable, we begin by noting that lagged residential price 
was highly significant in every case. This indicates a strong path dependency in retail price 
formation. No other estimated parameter was highly significant in all regions.   
 
As for wholesale price effects, only three non-competitive regions—SWPS, Magic Valley, 
and CPS—showed a positive statistically significant influence of the wholesale price on 
residential price. The parameter estimate on wholesale price for Austin Energy was 
statistically significant but negative, thereby indicating a major inconsistency with the 
paradigm of a price-taking electricity provider. Residential prices in the remaining non-
competitive regions—SWEP, Upshur, Victoria, and San Marcos—yielded no statistically  
significant influence of wholesale price. All the competitive regions in the sample—AEP-
CTX, AEP-NTX, Oncor, Reliant/CPT, and TX-NM—revealed a positive and statistically 
significant influence of wholesale prices on residential rates.  
 
  
																																																								
14 Data diagnostic testing was also performed. Augmented Dickey Fuller tests for unit roots indicated 
that each of the included time series variables—real residential rates, real wholesale rates, and real 
labor rates— is stationary (results available upon request). We also considered pooling the data and 
estimating a panel, but the data fails hypothesis testing of poolability. This is discussed in the text.  
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Labor rates were positive and statistically significant in all the competitive regions, but in 
only one non-competitive region—SWEP—while being negative and significant in 
another—CPS.  Again, this provides evidence that electricity providers in competitive 
market areas are behaving exactly as predicted by economic theory, while electricity 
providers in non-competitive market areas conform to an alternative paradigm. In short, 
market reform appears to be delivering what was anticipated in competitive market areas. 
 
The impact of the “price-to-beat” mechanism was estimated as a three-pronged effect in 
order to capture any effects it may have had on pricing until January 2007 and thereafter. In 
the competitive market areas, the statistically significant parameter estimate for the dummy 
variable, , indicates that the price-to-beat mechanism reduced the residential price for a 
given wholesale price and labor rate. However, the positive and statistically significant slope 
parameter on the time trend, , indicates that residential rates were generally increasing 
relative to wholesale rates and labor rates from January 2002 through December 2006. 
Given the fact that wholesale power prices were increasing over this period, the implication 
is that residential rates were actually increasing faster than wholesale rates during this time. 
However, after January 2007 the paradigm shifted in a statistically significant way. Namely, 
the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the time trend for January 2007 
through December 2016, , indicates that the residential price in competitive areas was 
declining relative to wholesale price and the labor rate. Given the fact that wholesale rates 
were declining over this period, the implication is that residential rates were falling faster. 
This result is consistent with electricity service providers experiencing cost reductions in 
dimensions other than the wholesale cost of electricity. 
 
In the non-competitive areas, by contrast, the parameter estimates on ,  , and  are 
inconsistent across regions. For example, in SWPS, SWEP, Upshur, and San Marcos, the 
only statistically significant parameter estimate is on the time trends, and the parameters 
are positive. This indicates that residential prices in these areas generally increased relative 
to the wholesale price of power and labor costs throughout the time period under 
consideration. Since these entities own generating assets, some of this could be related to 
increased power purchases from the wholesale market. This could happen, for example, if 
the average cost of the entity’s generation resources is lower than the cost of the marginal 
resource available in the wholesale market. As previously noted, the TCAP analysis 
suggested that increasing transmission costs over time could also explain the divergence 
between retail price and costs, although it is not clear why such an effect would be 
restricted to non-competitive markets. The exact explanation remains a matter of 
conjecture since data to test competing hypotheses was not available.  
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The remaining non-competitive regions—Magic Valley, Victoria, and Austin Energy— 
are similar to the competitive market areas with regard to the parameter estimates on 
,  , and , with Magic Valley exhibiting the same patterns revealed by the 
competitive areas. Victoria and Austin Energy have patterns similar to those exhibited in 
competitive areas until January 2007, but neither shows statistically significant evidence of 
residential price reductions relative to wholesale price and labor rates after January 2007. 
Thus, the same type of cost reduction evidenced for competitive areas is not revealed in 
the analysis for Victoria and Austin Energy. Lastly, the patterns for the estimated 
coefficients for CPS stand in stark contrast to the other regions, again indicating a very 
different paradigm at work in that market area. 
 
The seasonal patterns are most statistically relevant for residential pricing in non-
competitive areas. There is statistically significant evidence that residential prices are 
increased relative to wholesale prices in SWPS, SWEP, Austin Energy, and CPS during the 
summer months. This may be due to congestion constraints internal to these market areas. 
However, it also could be the result of price discrimination during high demand periods. 
Again, the data required to assess such competing hypotheses is not currently available.  
 
In Magic Valley, Upshur, Victoria, and San Marcos, the data indicate that residential rates 
actually decline relative to wholesale prices during summer months.15 Given there is some 
seasonality in wholesale price—it tends to rise in high demand months—this may be the 
result of price smoothing in these regions. In other words, residential rates generally do not 
fall during summer months; rather, they do not rise as much as wholesale price in high 
demand periods (so they fall relative to wholesale price).  Lastly, in competitive market 
areas there is little evidence of seasonal effects, with different months—ranging from April 
to August—revealing any statistically significant influence on residential prices in some 
regions. This is consistent with the result that wholesale price movements capture 
seasonality in competitive markets, which is simply passed on to consumers. This is 
reinforced by the positive statistically significant relationships estimated between 
wholesale and residential prices across all competitive market areas. 
 
A caveat for the analysis herein is that residents of areas with lower population density, for 
example in West Texas and South Texas, may see a greater portion of their bills reflect grid 
maintenance costs since grid costs per customer would be higher. This could reduce the 
influence of the wholesale price on residential rates, even in competitive areas. While this 
does not appear to be of concern in competitive areas, it may present an issue in non-
competitive areas, especially rural cooperatives. 
 
  
																																																								
15 San Marcos reveals a statistically significant relationship in only one month, May, while Upshur 
does in two months, Victoria in four months, and Magic Valley in every month. Importantly, peak 
demand months during the summer time show up as statistically significant in Upshur (August) and 
Victoria (July, August, and September).  
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Table 2. Parameter Estimates (1000kWh Customers) 
 
 
 
Note: Parameter values in gray are not statistically significant at a 10% level. Parameter values in blue are statistically significant at the  
10% level, parameter values in red are statistically significant at the 5% level, and parameter values in black are statistically significant at the  
1% level.  Parameter estimates for the are not reported, but are significant at the 1% level and are available upon request.  
Constant α 0 0.010878 -0.003829 0.086885 0.007998 0.056994 0.050135 0.083617 0.022316 -0.004216 -0.018176 -0.012130 -0.008362 -0.013392
std err 0.010557 0.013368 0.019734 0.005381 0.013420 0.010509 0.014705 0.011846 0.016782 0.029089 0.008187 0.009170 0.008713
L.p res α 1 0.689333 0.574643 0.496620 0.871785 0.703378 0.479151 0.275170 0.837823 0.817673 0.640333 0.859447 0.853703 0.884540
std err 0.027846 0.036824 0.039190 0.023004 0.026420 0.045629 0.049503 0.027058 0.016644 0.028641 0.012854 0.013172 0.013180
p w α 2 0.033535 -0.021604 0.178873 0.012773 0.006654 -0.040879 0.085994 0.013307 0.044858 0.072210 0.065241 0.060644 0.060832
std err 0.018891 0.024426 0.031585 0.009910 0.020097 0.015916 0.022468 0.018986 0.024927 0.041491 0.011457 0.011300 0.011729
w α 3 0.000008 0.000016 -0.000014 0.000001 -0.000010 0.000003 -0.000018 -0.000003 0.000019 0.000041 0.000017 0.000016 0.000016
std err 0.000006 0.000007 0.000010 0.000003 0.000007 0.000005 0.000007 0.000006 0.000009 0.000016 0.000005 0.000005 0.000005
D pb α 4 -0.001950 0.000988 -0.014228 0.000343 -0.011549 -0.004110 0.011229 -0.003460 -0.011390 -0.020354 -0.006340 -0.007383 -0.004440
std err 0.001940 0.002465 0.003847 0.000992 0.002590 0.001846 0.002617 0.002305 0.003428 0.005672 0.001827 0.002012 0.001830
t 1 α 5 0.000121 0.000084 0.000137 0.000029 0.000127 0.000148 -0.000103 0.000076 0.000194 0.000489 0.000123 0.000143 0.000076
std err 0.000036 0.000043 0.000062 0.000019 0.000041 0.000033 0.000043 0.000040 0.000057 0.000104 0.000030 0.000033 0.000030
t 2 α 6 0.000030 0.000021 -0.000067 0.000023 -0.000013 -0.000013 0.000122 -0.000009 -0.000092 -0.000169 -0.000060 -0.000063 -0.000049
std err 0.000013 0.000017 0.000025 0.000008 0.000016 0.000012 0.000019 0.000015 0.000023 0.000038 0.000012 0.000013 0.000012
Feb α 7 0.000284 0.006678 -0.006330 -0.000631 -0.000982 -0.000629 0.001349 -0.001459 0.000405 -0.000214 -0.000095 0.000812 0.000007
std err 0.001528 0.001913 0.002704 0.000766 0.001785 0.001406 0.001969 0.001702 0.002448 0.004224 0.001195 0.001333 0.001272
Mar α 8 -0.000130 0.005011 -0.004392 -0.000481 -0.001182 -0.000861 0.005487 -0.000600 0.001916 -0.003404 -0.000093 0.000357 -0.000578
std err 0.001525 0.001929 0.002699 0.000765 0.001784 0.001404 0.001968 0.001700 0.002445 0.004218 0.001194 0.001332 0.001271
Apr α 9 -0.000346 0.007579 -0.004104 -0.000556 0.000854 -0.001196 0.003083 0.000016 0.005061 0.005803 0.000659 0.001266 0.000028
std err 0.001526 0.001907 0.002701 0.000765 0.001784 0.001404 0.001990 0.001700 0.002445 0.004220 0.001194 0.001333 0.001271
May α 10 -0.000526 0.020898 -0.004583 -0.000045 -0.002319 0.005911 0.004717 -0.003485 -0.001741 0.002491 0.001633 0.002327 0.001153
std err 0.001527 0.001903 0.002710 0.000765 0.001795 0.001408 0.001988 0.001706 0.002453 0.004221 0.001194 0.001335 0.001271
Jun α 11 0.008315 0.013402 -0.006124 -0.000968 -0.001648 0.008380 0.013404 -0.002598 0.002173 0.000979 0.002696 0.001455 0.000798
std err 0.001536 0.002008 0.002730 0.000768 0.001804 0.001454 0.002013 0.001719 0.002466 0.004242 0.001197 0.001339 0.001275
Jul α 12 0.002246 0.013808 -0.005328 0.000464 -0.003355 0.005380 0.012098 0.001264 0.000973 0.000004 0.000104 0.000096 -0.000882
std err 0.001550 0.002027 0.002714 0.000769 0.001791 0.001517 0.002131 0.001710 0.002452 0.004261 0.001198 0.001336 0.001278
Aug α 13 0.000994 0.011045 -0.012466 -0.001221 -0.003795 0.005635 0.005679 -0.001738 -0.001368 -0.002252 -0.001300 -0.002081 -0.002686
std err 0.001634 0.002103 0.002762 0.000792 0.001825 0.001547 0.002178 0.001741 0.002494 0.004404 0.001217 0.001354 0.001303
Sep α 14 0.003988 0.011875 -0.010947 -0.000670 -0.003556 0.004756 0.007802 -0.001450 -0.001004 -0.003360 -0.000621 -0.000924 -0.000733
std err 0.001533 0.002001 0.002693 0.000765 0.001782 0.001505 0.002058 0.001703 0.002447 0.004227 0.001195 0.001334 0.001273
Oct α 15 -0.004860 0.010049 -0.014071 -0.000153 -0.002546 -0.001524 0.001247 -0.001054 -0.000441 -0.000649 -0.000388 -0.000483 -0.000436
std err 0.001539 0.002000 0.002780 0.000765 0.001783 0.001501 0.002049 0.001705 0.002449 0.004229 0.001195 0.001335 0.001273
Nov α 16 -0.001028 -0.003472 -0.006714 -0.001555 -0.000953 -0.004504 0.000969 -0.001522 0.000936 0.000547 0.001128 0.001681 0.000604
std err 0.001525 0.001975 0.002672 0.000756 0.001950 0.001401 0.001960 0.001709 0.002418 0.004233 0.001181 0.001318 0.001257
Dec α 17 0.002624 0.004591 -0.006597 -0.000269 0.003333 -0.001530 -0.000610 0.001506 -0.000839 0.000701 -0.000224 -0.000064 -0.000855
std err 0.001558 0.001937 0.002739 0.000778 0.001823 0.001428 0.002003 0.001733 0.002488 0.004297 0.001215 0.001356 0.001293
R2 0.827 0.835 0.772 0.947 0.829 0.740 0.667 0.762 0.929 0.842 0.982 0.977 0.976
Variable Parameter SWPS SWEP Magic Valley Upshur Victoria Austin Energy CPS San Marcos AEP-CTX AEP-NTX TX-NM
Non-Competitive Regions Competitive Regions
Oncor Reliant/CPT
pro
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It should be noted for completeness that we also considered other model specifications. 
For example, we considered a pooled approach using panel data, but the data across all 
market areas rejects poolability. Interestingly, the competitive market areas do not reject 
poolability when considered as a set independent of the non-competitive areas, suggesting 
competition drives retail rates to reflect wholesale rates, which themselves are driven by 
competition and regional arbitrage. In other words, pricing in the competitive areas 
appears to be driven by a common data-generating process—the wholesale market—
whereas pricing in the non-competitive areas does not. Indeed, tests for pooling only the 
data in non-competitive areas indicated the data cannot be pooled, so panel analysis is 
inappropriate for non-competitive market areas. 
 
V.  A Note on Commercial Electricity 
 
As mentioned above, we have begun collecting site-specific load and billing data from 
commercial electricity users in Texas.16 Aggregate data from the Texas PUC is available for 
commercial and industrial electricity users in non-competitive areas, but we lacked similar 
information for those users in competitive areas. Moreover, the data reported by the PUC 
is in aggregate. More detailed consumer-specific information for large electricity users is 
valuable because it allows a direct comparison of load and billing for a homogeneous 
consumer and consumer groups across different market areas. The data indicated in Figure 
7 represents over 760 locations across competitive and non-competitive market areas since 
January 2005. We are working to expand this dataset to include additional large 
commercial users, but some interesting insights are already emerging. 
 
The site-specific load and billing data are collected from commercial users under a 
confidentiality agreement with Rice University. These data are used to calculate implied 
rates by location (bill divided by load), , and then a weighted-average price for each 
region, , is calculated where the weight for each location is taken to be the share of 
regional load at a specific site, . We then plot , calculated as , in 
Figure 7. For a quality check, we also compared the average price data for locations in non-
competitive regions to data reported by the Texas PUC. The PUC data are area-wide 
regional aggregates whereas our data are for specific commercial customers in the market 
region, so they do not match exactly. Nevertheless, the annual averages match within half a 
cent in every year from 2005 through 2016. 
 
We see in Figure 7 that there is generally less separation between the commercial rates in 
competitive and non-competitive market areas. However, the commercial rates in 
competitive market areas have followed a pattern similar to wholesale rates, while the same 
is not true in non-competitive areas. In fact, for the data we have collected to date, 
																																																								
16 Note that the data collected is subject to a confidentiality agreement with Rice University. Hence, it 
cannot be distributed or shared.  
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commercial rates in competitive market areas have fallen relative to rates in non-
competitive market areas, and are now generally lower.  
 
Figure 7. Annual commercial electricity rates across market areas, 2005-2016* 
  
 
 
Data sources: See text for description 
*Commercial data for 2016 are incomplete, so year-to-date data is indicated. Also, note the data are 
annual averages so do not depict the seasonality in rates in some non-competitive areas. 
 
 
Table 3 indicates some summary statistics for the data presented in Figure 7. Interestingly, 
we see that the commercial price in a couple of non-competitive market areas—Magic 
Valley and Victoria—is similar to the data for competitive market areas with regard to both 
volatilities and averages. This may indicate that those electricity cooperatives more closely 
model themselves after competitive electricity providers in an effort to attract a larger 
customer base.   
 
We also see that since January 2005, the commercial rates for Austin Energy, CPS, and San 
Marcos have generally been less volatile than in other regions, but the rates have slightly 
increased through 2015 and are now higher across the board than rates in competitive 
market areas. Regarding competitive market areas, the general tendency for commercial 
customer rates has been to follow the wholesale market, which is similar to the outcome 
seen in the analysis of residential rates. Again, this is evidence that market reform has 
delivered exactly what was intended with regard to electricity pricing. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of Data Presented in Figure 7* 
 
 
 
Data sources: See text. 
*Commercial data for 2016 are incomplete, so calculations through 2015 are reported. 
 
 
In Figure 8, we have graphed a composite price for commercial electricity for competitive 
and non-competitive market areas alongside a composite price for residential electricity 
for competitive and non-competitive market areas and a composite wholesale price.  The 
composite prices are averages across market areas for the data in the sample. These are 
meant to be illustrative only. In particular, the data highlight an important point about 
relative pricing across sectors in competitive versus non-competitive areas. Namely, the 
spread between residential and commercial prices in non-competitive areas is much 
smaller than in competitive areas. Moreover, while residential rates across market areas 
have converged over the sample period (see above for more discussion), commercial rates 
have diverged, with those in competitive areas seeing a growing discount relative to non-
competitive areas. Indeed, a similar phenomenon is observable on a national level (see 
Figures 1 through 3).  
 
While there may be multiple explanations for the observations based on Figures 7 and 8, 
the data are consistent with a policy of cross-subsidizing residential customers with higher 
rates on commercial customers in non-competitive market areas. Such a policy is possible 
if a particular customer class has a lower elasticity of demand, meaning they are more 
subject to price discrimination with limited price responsiveness.17 Such might be the case 
for commercial customers because relocating their business activities away from their 
customers or employees in response to a change in energy price can compromise the 
firm’s economic model. Discriminatory pricing would be more likely in a regulated market 																																																								
17 For studies of cross-subsidization evidence between customer groups, see, for example, Steiner 
(2001), Hattori and Tsutsui (2004), and Erdogdu (2011). For studies of cross-subsidization between 
electricity sectors, see, for example, Eid, Guillén, Marín, and Hakvoort (2014), EEI (2013), and Pérez-
Arriaga, et al. (2013). 
Sample Average 
(Jan05-Dec15)
Std Deviation 
(Jan05-Dec15) 2005 Average 2015 Average
Rate Change 
(2005-2015)
Magic Valley 0.0917 0.0165 0.1005 0.0738 -0.0266
Victoria 0.0974 0.0141 0.1003 0.0826 -0.0177
Austin 0.0920 0.0045 0.0843 0.0935 0.0092
CPS 0.0799 0.0070 0.0754 0.0814 0.0060
San Marcos 0.0918 0.0090 0.0880 0.0969 0.0088
AEP-NTX/TX-NM 0.0887 0.0181 0.0965 0.0747 -0.0218
AEP-CTX 0.0938 0.0163 0.1003 0.0748 -0.0255
Oncor/AEP-NTX 0.0900 0.0187 0.1013 0.0666 -0.0347
Reliant/CPT 0.0884 0.0194 0.0981 0.0660 -0.0321
Wholesale-West 0.0467 0.0226 0.0801 0.0269 -0.0531
Wholesale-South 0.0483 0.0249 0.0765 0.0269 -0.0496
Wholesale-North 0.0469 0.0231 0.0800 0.0255 -0.0545
Wholesale-Houston 0.0485 0.0252 0.0811 0.0262 -0.0549
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area than in a competitive one because competition should force all electricity providers to 
charge prices that reflect the overall marginal cost of service. 
 
Figure 8. Average Rates Across Sectors by Aggregate Market Area* 
 
 
 
Data sources: See text for description 
*Commercial data for 2016 are incomplete, so year-to-date data is indicated. Also, note that the data 
presented are the respective annual averages across all competitive and non-competitive areas. 
Therefore, the data are representative and do not capture seasonal variations in rates or the disparity 
in rates within the non-competitive areas in particular. 
 
 
We are continuing to collect data from large commercial consumers across the state of 
Texas. Subsequent analysis will further evaluate the evidence that commercial users are 
being billed in a way that effectively cross-subsidizes residential users. It should be noted 
that while such a pricing policy may seem viable and perhaps even desired, particularly if 
residential consumer welfare is prioritized by the electricity service provider, it may be 
myopic as it ignores the adjustments that commercial entities can make. Specifically, while 
many commercial entities are not likely to relocate on the basis of higher electricity rates, 
they may be able to offset electricity costs through investments in on-site generation. As 
more commercial users are incentivized to move off grid, the local electricity service 
provider will be forced to raise rates to other customers in order to cover its costs. A cross-
subsidized rate to residential customers thus may be unsustainable. 
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VI.  Concluding Remarks 
 
Passage of Senate Bill 7 in 1999 launched Texas electricity market reform, but substantive 
changes did not begin until 2002. The evolution of wholesale and retail electricity market 
prices since has been dynamic, but competition has yielded an outcome consistent with 
what economic theory predicts. Namely, retail prices have declined relative to wholesale 
prices in competitive market areas. 
 
At the residential level, prices were much higher in competitive areas than in non-
competitive areas when reforms were first implemented—but they have since fallen to a 
point of parity with non-competitive market areas. This outcome highlights the importance 
of evaluating market dynamics over time rather than focusing on sample averages. Thus, 
residential consumers in competitive areas paid a higher average price for electricity from 
January 2002 through December 2016 than did customers in non-competitive areas. But this 
fact masks the underlying trends that market reforms have wrought. While the average price 
paid by residential customers in 2002 in areas that subsequently became competitive was 
between two and three cents higher than the rates paid in areas that remained non-
competitive, this was before competition could have had any impact. More importantly, 
residential prices declined in all competitive market areas from 2002 to 2016, while they 
increased in all non-competitive market areas over the same time period. As a result, by 
2016, the average price paid by residential customers in some competitive market areas was 
lower than the average price paid in non-competitive market areas. 
 
In addition, while wholesale electricity prices declined from 2002 to 2016, with a 
significant increase in the interim, the declines observed in residential prices in 
competitive market areas were generally larger than the declines in wholesale prices. This 
is consistent with a market in which competitive electricity service providers are realizing 
efficiency gains and cost reductions. 
 
Overall, the changes in wholesale and residential prices from 2002 to 2016, and the 
patterns of volatility in the price series, support the notion that retail prices clearly reflect 
wholesale prices in competitive market areas. Indeed, the econometric analysis consistently 
indicated a positive and statistically significant relationship between wholesale price and 
residential price across competitive market areas. This suggests that allowing competition 
in markets has delivered the intended result.  
 
We also found that trends in the commercial electricity billing and load data that have been 
collected to date reveal an outcome that is consistent with the analysis of residential price 
data. The relative prices between the commercial and residential sectors across  
competitive and non-competitive market areas also support the notion that competition 
forces electricity service providers toward pricing power at overall marginal cost. While 
commercial rates in competitive areas track wholesale prices, the evidence is mixed in non-
competitive market areas. This reinforces the results from the analysis of residential prices 
that a lack of competition allows greater divergence between price and marginal cost. 
Furthermore, the differences between residential and commercial prices in the two types 
Electricity Reform and Retail Pricing in Texas 
26 
of areas is consistent with non-competitive suppliers exercising a degree of market power 
to redistribute from commercial to residential customers. In particular, the data reveal that 
price reductions for commercial customers in non-competitive market areas have not 
generally been forthcoming, despite the fact that wholesale prices have declined. 
 
In sum, the data analyzed herein support the notion that prices have behaved exactly as 
economic theory would indicate in competitive market areas. There are still research 
questions to be addressed. For example, more research is needed to understand the 
objective of suppliers in non-competitive areas. Multiple hypotheses could explain the 
pricing paradigms we have observed. One obvious challenge is in data collection, since data 
on electricity loads, which are necessary when considering non-competitive markets, may 
not be readily available for each market area. We endeavor to address this and other 
questions by collecting data from large commercial users across the state of Texas, which 
will provide a unique opportunity to more rigorously evaluate how individual sites 
compare across market areas.   
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Parameter Estimates (500kWh Customers) 
 
 
 
Note: Parameter values in gray are not statistically significant at a 10% level. Parameter values in blue are statistically significant at the  
10% level, parameter values in red are statistically significant at the 5% level, and parameter values in black are statistically significant at the  
1% level.  Parameter estimates for the are not reported, but are significant at the 1% level and are available upon request. 
Constant α 0 0.010132 -0.001537 0.100811 0.010376 0.054471 0.032376 0.095389 0.022736 -0.002627 -0.015108 -0.008929 -0.002375 -0.014455
std err 0.010650 0.011392 0.019593 0.005566 0.013912 0.007814 0.014863 0.011891 0.017024 0.028435 0.008427 0.009545 0.009155
L.p res α 1 0.693943 0.628157 0.497465 0.871766 0.729213 0.642903 0.249113 0.841873 0.818640 0.656834 0.860657 0.858541 0.885477
std err 0.027867 0.034009 0.038881 0.022767 0.025879 0.035520 0.052596 0.026689 0.016717 0.027370 0.012515 0.013186 0.013093
p w α 2 0.032988 -0.016704 0.178157 0.011390 0.005295 -0.024162 0.071334 0.014786 0.046827 0.078676 0.064246 0.059423 0.061037
std err 0.019086 0.020734 0.030669 0.010087 0.020780 0.012127 0.022022 0.019044 0.025409 0.050135 0.011566 0.011572 0.012213
w α 3 0.000008 0.000016 -0.000017 0.000000 -0.000007 0.000001 -0.000021 -0.000002 0.000017 0.000037 0.000015 0.000012 0.000016
std err 0.000006 0.000006 0.000010 0.000003 0.000007 0.000004 0.000007 0.000006 0.000009 0.000016 0.000005 0.000005 0.000005
D pb α 4 -0.000932 0.001820 -0.012131 0.000573 -0.010903 -0.002828 0.011471 -0.003531 -0.009137 -0.013787 -0.005158 -0.006043 -0.003138
std err 0.001948 0.002099 0.003685 0.001011 0.002672 0.001401 0.002580 0.002323 0.003394 0.005385 0.001784 0.001988 0.001793
t 1 α 5 0.000115 0.000054 0.000121 0.000028 0.000125 0.000111 -0.000077 0.000079 0.000190 0.000442 0.000124 0.000127 0.000067
std err 0.000036 0.000036 0.000060 0.000019 0.000043 0.000025 0.000043 0.000040 0.000058 0.000101 0.000030 0.000033 0.000031
t 2 α 6 0.000039 0.000015 -0.000048 0.000030 -0.000008 -0.000001 0.000147 -0.000009 -0.000064 -0.000106 -0.000044 -0.000042 -0.000031
std err 0.000013 0.000014 0.000024 0.000008 0.000016 0.000009 0.000019 0.000015 0.000022 0.000035 0.000012 0.000013 0.000012
Feb α 7 0.000498 0.006245 -0.006328 -0.000229 -0.001429 -0.000864 0.001464 -0.001454 0.000481 -0.000365 0.000153 0.000781 0.000357
std err 0.001542 0.001619 0.002628 0.000779 0.001845 0.001069 0.001931 0.001707 0.002483 0.004130 0.001228 0.001382 0.001338
Mar α 8 0.000017 0.004324 -0.004414 -0.000487 -0.001625 -0.001003 0.008015 -0.000622 0.001929 -0.003306 -0.000114 0.000237 -0.000325
std err 0.001540 0.001635 0.002622 0.000779 0.001844 0.001067 0.001931 0.001705 0.002480 0.004124 0.001227 0.001382 0.001337
Apr α 9 -0.000215 0.007054 -0.004151 -0.000571 0.000314 -0.001313 0.002914 -0.000023 0.005105 0.005261 0.000642 0.001256 0.000118
std err 0.001540 0.001615 0.002625 0.000778 0.001844 0.001067 0.001981 0.001705 0.002480 0.004126 0.001227 0.001382 0.001337
May α 10 -0.000359 0.016081 -0.004648 -0.000069 -0.002789 -0.001114 0.005487 -0.003567 -0.001632 0.002131 0.001766 0.001896 0.001230
std err 0.001542 0.001614 0.002633 0.000778 0.001856 0.001070 0.001954 0.001711 0.002488 0.004127 0.001227 0.001384 0.001337
Jun α 11 0.008353 0.008912 -0.006216 -0.000989 -0.002327 0.002638 0.006226 -0.002623 0.002107 0.000381 0.002284 0.001158 0.000982
std err 0.001550 0.001684 0.002652 0.000782 0.001865 0.001078 0.001986 0.001725 0.002501 0.004147 0.001230 0.001388 0.001341
Jul α 12 0.002276 0.010102 -0.005453 0.000508 -0.003955 0.000137 0.007052 0.001212 0.000884 -0.000659 0.000126 -0.000269 -0.000824
std err 0.001565 0.001686 0.002636 0.000783 0.001851 0.001077 0.001991 0.001715 0.002487 0.004165 0.001231 0.001385 0.001344
Aug α 13 0.001024 0.006735 -0.012604 -0.001219 -0.004342 0.000217 0.002732 -0.001817 -0.001509 -0.002928 -0.001501 -0.002217 -0.002527
std err 0.001649 0.001750 0.002683 0.000806 0.001886 0.001100 0.002039 0.001747 0.002530 0.004304 0.001250 0.001403 0.001370
Sep α 14 0.004025 0.008083 -0.011119 -0.000728 -0.004103 -0.000315 0.002278 -0.001506 -0.001167 -0.003911 -0.000677 -0.001183 -0.000500
std err 0.001547 0.001662 0.002616 0.000779 0.001841 0.001073 0.001961 0.001708 0.002482 0.004133 0.001228 0.001383 0.001339
Oct α 15 -0.004827 0.006276 -0.015027 -0.000190 -0.003078 -0.004240 0.003449 -0.000945 -0.000478 -0.001169 -0.000240 -0.000542 -0.000209
std err 0.001553 0.001661 0.002701 0.000779 0.001843 0.001073 0.001944 0.001711 0.002484 0.004136 0.001228 0.001384 0.001339
Nov α 16 -0.000949 -0.002501 -0.006452 -0.001601 -0.001421 -0.001496 0.001028 -0.001553 0.000969 0.000396 0.001534 0.001664 0.000911
std err 0.001540 0.001646 0.002601 0.000770 0.002017 0.001057 0.001924 0.001714 0.002452 0.004138 0.001214 0.001366 0.001322
Dec α 17 0.002667 0.003659 -0.006458 -0.000303 0.002973 -0.001457 -0.000532 0.001457 -0.000678 0.000704 -0.000068 -0.000016 -0.000556
std err 0.001572 0.001641 0.002661 0.000792 0.001882 0.001086 0.001965 0.001739 0.002524 0.004202 0.001249 0.001406 0.001361
Non-Competitive Regions Competitive Regions
Variable Parameter SWPS SWEP Magic Valley Upshur Victoria Austin Energy CPS San Marcos AEP-CTX AEP-NTX Oncor Reliant/CPT TX-NM
pro
iD
